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CIVIL PROCEDUREITORT LAW-BETTER OFF DEAD?: 
MINORITY TOLLING PROVISION CANNOT SAVE DECEASED CHILD'S 
CLAIM 
It has been said that a child who loses a parent is an orphan. 
A man who loses his wife is a widower. A woman who loses her 
husband is a widow. There is no name for a parent who loses a 
child, for there are no words to describe this pain. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Terron Vance, born September 15, 1994, was taken to Henry 
Ford Hospital in Detroit on July 31, 2002, as a result of pain caused 
by sickle cell anemia.2 He was admitted to the hospital for treat­
ment and on the following day, just before his eighth birthday, he 
died of an alleged morphine overdose.3 Following his death, Dwun­
neka Vance was appointed personal representative of Terron 
Vance's estate. She filed a medical malpractice wrongful death ac­
tion on September 13, 2004, two days before he would have turned 
ten. 
Dwunneka Vance believed these complaints were filed timely 
under the savings provision, section 600.5851(7) of the Michigan 
Compiled Laws, which states, 
if, at the time a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a 
person under section 5838a the person has not reached his or her 
eighth birthday, a person shall not bring an action based on the 
claim unless the action is commenced on or before the person's 
tenth birthday ....4 
Because Terron Vance had not reached the age of eight before 
he died, Dwunneka Vance made sure to file before Terron's tenth 
birthday.5 However, the defendant-Henry Ford Hospital-moved 
to dismiss as an untimely filing, arguing that the applicable statute 
1. Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, N.Y. City, 9/11 Remembrance Ceremony (Sept. 
11, 2004), available at http://transcripts.cnn.comffRANSCRIPTS/0409/11/se.01.html. 
2. Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d 78, 79 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006). 
3. [d. at 79. 
4. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7) (West 2000) (footnote omitted). 
5. See Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 79. 
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of limitations was section 600.5851(1) of the Michigan Compiled 
Laws, which provides, 
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (7) and (8), if 
the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action 
under this act is under 18 years of age ... at the time the claim 
accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 
1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, 
to ... bring the action although the period of limitations has run. 
This section does not lessen the time provided for in section 
5852.6 
The defendant believed that Terron's death removed his dis­
ability; thus, they argued that the appropriate limitation period for 
Mrs. Vance to file as personal representative of Terron's estate had 
expired under section 5852.7 
The court, in deciding this issue, would determine whether the 
Vance family could argue its claims and have its day in court, or 
whether the hospital would be excused from defending itself against 
a stale claim. Thus, a decision in favor of the defendant would fore­
close the claim of any parent who was relying on section 
600.5851(7) to bring an action as a result of her child's death. 
Several other states have had occasion to consider statutes with 
seemingly inconsistent infancy tolling provisions where medical 
malpractice is involved in the death of a child.8 The majority of 
courts, including the court in Vance, have come to the same conclu­
sion-a child ceases to have birthdays after he dies; therefore, the 
savings provision no longer applies as it would if he had survived. 
Instead, the applicable statute of limitations is that which applies to 
the personal representative of the deceased's estate.9 
6. MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(1). Subsection 5852, in relevant part, 
states that a personal representative may initiate suit, "any time within 2 years after 
letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run." 
7. Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 80; see also MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5852 (West 
2002). 
8. See generally Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2003); Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), superseded by statute, 
IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (2008), as recognized in Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d 657 
(Ind. 2006); Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 2005); Baker v. Binder, 609 N.E.2d 
1240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428 (N.M. 
1985); Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Campos v. Ysleta Gen. 
Hosp., Inc. (Campos J/), 879 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App. 1994). While the parties are the 
same in Campos I, the causes of action are not interrelated. See Campos v. Ysleta Gen. 
Hosp., Inc. (Campos I), 836 S.W.2d 791,793 (Tex. App. 1992); see also infra note 108. 
9. Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 82-83. See generally cases cited supra note 8. 
493 2009] BETTER OFF DEAD? 
From the point of view of these courts, there is no doubt that 
the claims filed in accordance with infancy tolling provisions are 
untimely if the child has died. Although it may seem like this 
bright-line rule is proper under rules of statutory construction and 
interpretation, it misses the ultimate intent of the legislature and 
produces unjust results. There is no doubt that the Vances had a 
viable medical malpractice claim, and that had Terron survived the 
morphine overdose and filed a negligence suit on his own behalf on 
the same date that his administrator did, his claim would have gone 
forward. Yet, because Terron died as a result of the alleged negli­
gence and his family relied on the inapplicable statute of limita­
tions, the family was left with no judicial recourse. 
Whether a personal representative of a deceased child's estate 
should be able to rely on the same statute of limitations that would 
have applied to the child is a matter of statutory interpretation. 
Courts have uniformly decided in the negative. This Note suggests 
that a look into legislative history provides a rationale in opposition 
to the courts' views, and that allowing this type of claim to go for­
ward is in line with both legislative intent and the general goals of 
the adversarial system. Part I discusses the origin of statutes of lim­
itation as well as the development of tort law, including wrongful 
death actions. Part II describes the modern application of statutes 
of limitation to tort law in the context of minority tolling provisions 
and medical malpractice lawsuits. Part III discusses the relevant 
case law dealing with the death of minors due to alleged medical 
malpractice and the courts' rejection of reliance on minority tolling 
provisions by the minor's estate. Finally, Part IV analyzes the flaws 
in the rationale of those courts, followed by the presentation of a 
fresh approach to interpreting the statutes that both supports legis­
lative intent and promotes public policy.lO 
10. It should be noted that although medical malpractice litigation is at issue in 
the Note, it is a vast area of law which has been thoroughly examined in other materials. 
See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLI­
TICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPU­
TATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACfICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2004); Alec Shelby Bayer, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving into the Roots of 
the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis,S Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'y 111 (2005); Scott 
Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation Can Alleviate 
the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 907 
(1999); Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in 
Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 943 (2004); Anthony J. Sebok, Dis­
patches From the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (reviewing TOM BAKER, THE 
MEDICAL MALPRACfICE MYTH (2005)). While this Note will mention the medical mal­
practice environment in which the relevant statutes and amendments were passed, it 
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I. LIMITATION ON AcrION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF TORT LAW 
A statute of limitation is generally defined as "a statute as­
signing a certain time after which rights cannot be enforced by legal 
action or offenses cannot be punished."l1 Its purpose is to "require 
diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and 
predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be re­
solved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh."12 Today's 
common understanding of statutory limitations is the result of four 
hundred years of variations and development.13 
A. The Statute of James 
The Statute of James was the first limitation-on-action stat­
uteY It was enacted in England in 1623 out of a desire to prohibit 
land from becoming unproductive.15 Disputes required lengthy in­
vestigation and litigation, during which time the land could not be 
used.16 Because with the passage of time it became impossible to 
detect a defective title, statutes of limitation were adopted to "cure 
this defect" and "repair the injuries committed by time."17 Several 
limitation periods were established and subsequently abandoned. 
Consequently, as Lord Coke understood, "many suits, troubles, and 
inconveniences" arose, leading to the development of "one con­
stant law," which "certain limitations might serve, both for the time 
present, and for all times to come."18 Thus, England enacted The 
Statute of James, "An Act for Limitation on Action, and for avoid-
does so only in an attempt to understand the legislative intent behind extending time 
for minors to file medical malpractice suits. 
11. MERRIAM·WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1220 (11th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MER. 
RIAM-WEBSTER'Sl. 
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1450-51 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S]' 
13. See Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 
1177 (1950). 
14. See J.K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW 
AND SUITS IN EQUITY AND ADMIRALTY 6 (John Wilder May ed., 5th ed. 1869); Gail L. 
Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of 
Laches, 1992 BYU L. REV. 917,925-26. 
15. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 6. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
18. Id. at 9-10. Lord Coke served as the Chief Justice of the King's Bench during 
the reign of James I. See generally 2 CUTHBERT WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE LIFE OF SIR 
EDWARD COKE, LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND IN THE REIGN OF JAMES I (Kes­
singer Publishing 2007) (1845). 
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ing of Suits at Law."19 The American colonies later adopted the 
same statute.20 
B. The Development of Tort Law in America 
While statutes of limitation have been recognized since the 
1600s, tort law did not develop as an independent branch of law 
until late in the nineteenth century.21 During the spread of industri­
alization at that time, many negligence cases arose between people 
who had previously been strangers. Simultaneously, a wave of legal 
scholars began to "question and discard old bases of legal classifica­
tion. "22 This combination sparked the independence of torts as its 
own legal category. 
In the 1870s, Oliver Wendell Holmes, lr. emerged as one of the 
first scholars to explore the subject.23 His greatest contribution was 
defining negligence as a separate principle of tort law, which was 
significant in two aspects.24 First, his definition expanded the con­
cept of "neglect of a specific, predetermined duty to that of [a] vio­
lation of a more general duty potentially owed to all the world. "25 
Second, it "provide[d] Torts with a philosophical principle: no liabil­
ity for tortious conduct absent fault."26 Additionally, Holmes ar­
gued that fault was a requirement of liability, both in the strict 
sense of intentional wrongs, as well as in the loose meaning of negli­
gent, unintentional wrongs.27 
19. An Act for Limitation on Action, and for Avoiding of Suits at Law, 21 lac., c. 
16, § 1 (1623) (Eng.), reprinted in H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF 
AcnONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 631 (1882); see also Heriot, supra note 14, at 926 
(noting that the statute" provided specific lengths of time for numerous real property 
and personal actions. It explicitly tolled these limitation periods for infancy, insanity, 
imprisonment, coverture, and absence from the realm, but was silent concerning igno­
rance. This statute is the model for statutes of limitation adopted by American 
legislatures"). 
20. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 10. 
21. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 
(1980). 
22. ld. At this time Cambridge intellectuals, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
Nicholas St. John Green, began to challenge the writ pleading system, a system en­
trenched in esoteric pleading technicalities. Id. at 6-8. Dissatisfaction with the system 
gave way to law-revision committees in Massachusetts and New York in order to make 
the law more accessible to lay people. ld. at 8-9. With the collapse of the writ system, 
contemporaneous legal thought brought forth the inception of torts as its own classifica­
tion. ld. at 3. 
23. ld. at 6-7. 
24. ld. at 13. 
25. ld. 
26. ld. (footnote omitted). 
27. ld. 
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Holmes's principle that the law imposes a duty of care as well 
as the ideas of fault and negligence are still chief components of the 
modern day tort definition.28 While tort law has expanded since the 
1800s to include specific wrongs such as wrongful death and medical 
malpractice, the theory on which it is based has remained constant: 
"[The] widespread attitude ... which presumes that most injured 
persons are entitled to compensation . . . . "29 The public policy 
goals of modern tort law are compensating victims and deterring 
tortious conduct.30 
C. Wrongful Death Causes of Action 
At common law, a cause of action in tort did not survive the 
victim's death.31 No action could be brought on behalf of the dece­
dent and no recovery could be obtained. Hence, "it was cheaper 
for the.defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him, and ... the 
most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim, 
who frequently were destitute, without a remedy."32 Thus, all 
wrongful death actions are a result of statutory creation. 
An action for wrongful death is "[a] lawsuit brought on behalf 
of a decedent's survivors for their damages resulting from a tortious 
injury that caused the decedent's death."33 Its purpose is "to com­
pensate the statutory beneficiaries for their own loss resulting from 
the death."34 Awarding damages for wrongful death addresses the 
needs of the injured party-the beneficiary-while at the same time 
seeking to deter the defendant from further wrongdoing. In the 
Vance case, the beneficiary may have had costly medical bills, 
among other expenses, and undoubtedly would have wanted to pre­
vent future negligent behavior of the hospital and staff. 
Compensating the Vance family and preventing the further 
negligence by the Henry Ford Hospital seems like a win-win, but 
28. See BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 1526. A tort is defined as "[a] civil wrong ... 
for which a remedy may be obtained, usu[alJy] in the form of damages; a breach of a 
duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another." 
Id. 
29. WHITE, supra note 21, at xv. 
30. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'y 583, 585 (1993). 
3l. . Melissa Lyn McLeod Hamrick, Comment, The MUlA: Bad Medicine and 
Bad Law Is a Costly Combination for Texas Minors with Medical Death Claims, 3 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 123, 141 (1996). 
32. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984)). 
33. BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 1644. 
34. In re McCoy, 373 F. Supp. 870, 875 (W.D. Tex. 1974). 
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the Vance family was not so fortunate. In this case, it was cheaper 
for the hospital to kill Terron Vance than it would have been to 
injure him.35 This outcome turns on three factors: the application 
of limitation on action to modern tort law; the atmosphere in which 
recent statutory limits have been enacted; and the court's "plain 
meaning interpretation" of the statutes at issue.36 
II. THE MODERN ApPLICATION OF LIMITATIONS 
ON ACTION TO TORT LAW 
Many American statutes of limitation closely resemble the 
original Statute of James37 and aim to remedy the same policy is­
sues that plagued seventeenth-century England.38 Nearly all ac­
tions today in the United States are governed by statutes of 
limitation, which "usually fix time limits ... on ... actions for inju­
ries to the person ... and 'all other actions."'39 Each state has 
varying versions of limitations on actions but they usually utilize 
one of two possible constructions: (1) "all actions ... shall be 
brought within" or (2) "no action ... shall be brought more than" a 
35. Hamrick, supra note 31, at 141. Had Terron survived he and his family would 
have been able to use his tenth birthday as the applicable statute of limitations. Thus, 
the hospital would not have been relieved of its liability. 
36. See generally Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d 78 (Mich. Ct. 
App.2006). 
37. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 14 (John Wilder May ed., 6th ed. 1876) (stating 
that "American acts of limitations, as they relate to personal actions ... , are either an 
exact transcript of the statute of James, or a revision and modification of it ...."). The 
Statute of James provided that: 
For quieting of men's estates and avoiding of suits, be it enacted by the 
King's most excellent majesty ... that all writs of formedon in descender ... in 
remainder ... in reverter, at any time hereafter to be sued or brought, of, or 
for any mannors, lands, tenements ... whereunto any person or persons now 
hath or have any title, or cause to have or pursue any such writ, shall be sued 
or taken within twenty years next after the end of this present session of Par­
liament: And after the said twenty years expired, no person, or persons, or any 
of their heirs, shall have or maintain any such writ .... 
An Act for Limitation on Action, and for Avoiding of Suits at Law, 21 Jac., c. 16, § 1 
(1623) (Eng.), reprinted in WOOD, supra note 19, at 631. 
38. See Note, supra note 13, at 1185 ("There comes a time when [a person] ought 
to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient 
obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.''' (footnote omitted) (quot­
ing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944))). 
39. [d. at 1179. Some crimes, such as those punishable by death, do not have a 
statutory period of limitation. See 18 U.S.c. § 3281 (2006) ("An indictment for any 
offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limitation."). 
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specific number of years after the cause of action accrues.40 Fur­
ther, there is a large array of statutes of limitation that attempt to 
deal with special situations, such as those actions affecting minors 
and disabled persons.41 
Since the inception of the Statute of James, it has been recog­
nized that there are some situations in which the statute of limita­
tion that is applicable to most should not be applicable to all: 
It is provided by the seventh section of the statute of James, 
that if any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions 
therein mentioned, shall be at the time of the cause of action 
accrued, within the age of twenty-one years ... such person shall 
be at liberty to bring the same actions within the times limited by 
the statute, after his disability has terminated.42 
This type of infancy provision is prevalent in United States 
statutes today.43 From California44 to Massachusetts,45 each state 
has had an infancy exception extending the period of limitation. 
However, in order to utilize the extension, the disability must exist 
at the time that the action accrues-meaning that a disability that 
affects the claimant after the cause of action has accrued will not 
delay or interrupt the running of the statute.46 This rationale re­
flects a sentiment that the claimant who has had some opportunity 
to bring a claim is less deserving of a suspension.47 Additionally, 
"the dangers of indefinite postponement have impelled the choice 
40. Note, supra note 13, at 1179 (omissions in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
41. Id. 
42. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 194. 
43. For a comparative look at various state statutes, see Harry B. Littell, A Com­
parison of the Statutes of Limitations, 21 IND. L.J. 23 (1945). 
44. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (1975), invalidated by Arredondo v. Re­
gents of Univ. of Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Although no longer in 
force because it was held to violate minors' rights to equal protection, this statute 
stated: "Actions by a minor shall be commenced within three years from the date of the 
alleged wrongful act except that actions by a minor under the full age of six years shall 
be commenced within three years or prior to his eighth birthday whichever provides a 
longer period." Id. For a more in depth discussion of this topic, see generally Natalie 
Mantell, Note, Limitations on a Minor's Right to Sue for Medical Malpractice: A Consti­
tutional Analysis, 10 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 97 (2005). 
45. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006) ("[A]ny claim by a minor against 
a health care provider ... shall be commenced within three years from the date the 
cause of action accrues, except that a minor under the full age of six years shall have 
until his ninth birthday in which the action may be commenced ...."). 
46. Note, supra note 13, at 1229. 
47. Id. at 1230. 
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of the termination of existing disabilities as a convenient, if arbi­
trary, time to commence the running of the statutory period."48 
A. General Rationale for the Minor's Exception Provisions 
Determining the purpose of both the general limitation and the 
exception are necessary to establish why denying recovery to the 
Vance family is both immoral and judicially unsound. Statutes of 
limitation, once used to settle land disputes, have evolved to extend 
to nearly all facets of the law.49 They "prescribe[] time limits on 
the assertion of rights, ... depriv[ing] one party of the opportunity, 
after a time, of invoking the public power in support of an other­
wise valid claim."50 Legislatures have used these limitations prima­
rily to protect defendants,51 reasoning that there should be a time 
when a potential defendant's "slate has been wiped clean of ancient 
obligations."52 However, in personal actions, the main considera­
tion behind limiting actions is that after a certain length of time, 
there is a lack of evidence and available witnesses.53 Therefore, by 
setting a limitation, the courts have been relieved of adjudicating 
"inconsequential or tenuous claims. "54 
Because statutes of limitation are generally enacted to protect 
the rights of defendants, legislatures have adopted exclusionary 
rules to also protect minor plaintiffs. Exceptions are needed to pro­
tect minors until they can decide themselves whether to pursue a 
claim.55 For example, this provision relates to the situation where 
"a minor has no parent or guardian to bring suit on its behalf, or 
whose parent or guardian may, for any number of perfectly valid 
reasons, be unwilling or unable to do SO."56 The provisions also 
allow for a situation in which, because of a child's age, he is incom­
petent to testify on his own behalf, or the full scope of his injuries 
has not materialized during the regularly applicable time period.57 
48. Id. 
49. See Littell, supra note 43. 
50. Note, supra note 13, at 1185. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. This Note also points out that unsettled claims can have an adverse effect 
on commercial business. 
54. !d. 
55. Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1214 (citing Robinson v. Pa. Hosp., 737 A.2d 
291, 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999». 
56. Robinson, 737 A.2d at 294. 
57. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428, 430 (N.M. 1985) (citing 
Slade v. Slade, 468 P.2d 627 (N.M. 1970». 
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This purpose relates directly to the situation in Vance, in which Ter­
ron was unable to communicate his injuries to his parents and the 
full scope of the injuries included his death, which, clearly rendered 
him unable to testify.58 
B. The Medical Malpractice Facet 
Because poor medical treatment can be fatal, wrongful death 
suits often arise from medical malpractice. Beginning for the first 
time in the 1970s, a wave of legislative action swept the nation.59 
Inspired by a perceived crisis in medical malpractice litigation, the 
solution, legislatures agreed, was medical malpractice tort reform.60 
In the 1980s, medical malpractice insurance premiums skyrock­
eted.61 The legislative solution this time was to limit the avenues 
for plaintiffs to get into court and, through tort reform, limit what 
could be done once in the courtroom.62 Most recently in 2002, in­
surance premiums rose again, and, not surprisingly, the effect has 
been further reform.63 Controversy exists over whether medical 
malpractice liability insurance premiums are an accurate reflection 
of the number of malpractice suits being filed.64 However, the in­
surance companies-for the most part-are not raising premiums 
and supporting tort reform in an effort to make more money at the 
public's expense.65 Rather, they are concerned that there is a mal­
practice litigation epidemic.66 This perceived epidemic has sparked 
the type of reform that limits the amount of time a plaintiff has to 
bring a malpractice suit and encourages the judiciary to narrowly 
interpret statutes that would extend this limitation period.67 
58. Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d. 78 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006). 
59. BAKER, supra note 10, at 1 (2005). 




64. ld. at 3. 
65. ld. at 6-8. 
66. ld. at 8. 
67. See, e.g., Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003). In Randolph, the court stated: 
The Medical Malpractice Act was enacted in response to increasing insurance 
premiums.... The purpose of the act was to provide health care providers 
with some protection from malpractice claims in order to preserve the availa­
bility of medical services .... Interpreting the statute of limitations exception 
for minors to include deceased minors would expand liability for health care 
providers, and would not be consistent with the goals of the Medical Malprac­
tice Act. 
Id. at 236. 
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Regardless of the "true concern" of the insurance companies, 
there has been evidence available since the rnid-1970s that suggests 
almost the opposite. The California Hospital and Medical Associa­
tions sponsored a study during that period that was expected to 
support the need for tort reform.68 Instead, the report revealed 
that medical malpractice affected tens of thousands of victims every 
year, more than automobile and workplace accidents, and that the 
victims did not sue.69 What then has made the insurance premiums 
spike during certain periods in the last thirty years? Evidence sug­
gests that it is due to "financial trends and competitive behavior in 
the insurance industry," not litigious Americans.7o 
Still, media focus remains on mass torts, products liability, and 
medical malpractice; and the symbiotic relationship between doc­
tors, health insurers, and businesses keeps medical malpractice and 
tort at the forefront of political debates.71 For example, in January 
of 2005, President Bush delivered a speech in Collinsville, Illinois, 
on the issue of medical liability reform.72 He stood beneath a large 
banner printed with the words "Affordable Healthcare."73 Both 
the banner and his address on the "broken medical liability system" 
reflected the president's view that health care costs cannot be re­
duced without tort reform.74 The president continued to outline his 
ideas designed to control health care costs,75 and finally, arrived at 
his main point: 
What's happening all across this country is that lawyers are filing 
baseless suits against hospitals and doctors .... They know the 
medical liability system is tilted in their favor. Jury awards in 
medical liability cases have skyrocketed in recent years. That 
means every claim filed by a personal-injury lawyer brings the 
chance of a huge payoff .... And because the system is so unpre­
dictable, there is a constant risk of being hit by a massive jury 
award.76 
68. BAKER, supra note 10, at 2. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. at 3. For example, during the 1980s, the costs of insurance investment and 
loss predictions were built into the price of malpractice premiums. [d. at 51. Once 
optimistic in their predictions, insurers who had offered low premiums had switched to 
more pessimistic predictions for the late 1980s and therefore increased their premiums. 
[d. at 51-52. 
71. [d. at 8-12. 
72. [d. at 12. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. at 13. 
75. [d. 
76. ld. 
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Not surprisingly, the association between contempt towards 
the frivolous lawsuit, the slimy lawyer, and the baseless claim and 
increased insurance premiums and unaffordable health care has led 
to the tort reform that has changed the statutory landscape of our 
current legal system. Yet, what about the Vance family? Its claim 
was neither baseless nor frivolous; its lawsuit was not filed in hopes 
of an unpredictable massive jury award; and the medical liability 
system was certainly not tilted in its favor. How is it that this family 
slipped through the cracks of the legal system? 
III. CASE LAW SUPPORTS DEFENDANTS 
Parents attempting to rely on the statute of limitations that 
would have been available to their child, if living, have a strong 
moral argument but can rely on little precedent. Case law over­
whelmingly supports defendants on the issue of whether a minority 
tolling provision extends to administrators of a deceased minor's 
estate.77 While courts have been clear on the outcome-parents 
cannot rely on the provision that tolls the statute of limitations for 
minors-they have arrived at this conclusion via two avenues of 
thought. The first line of reasoning is based on the child's birthday, 
and the second finds support in the courts' interpretation of legisla­
tive intent. 
A. The "Birthday Rationale" 
Many of the statutes extending the time for minors to file a 
claim measure that extension in terms of the child's birthday, for 
example, "on or before the person's tenth birthday."78 The "birth­
day rationale" refers to the reasoning behind which some courts 
77. See Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
(exception in statute of limitations only applies to a living child); Bailey v. Martz, 488 
N.E.2d 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (minor's death removed age disability), superseded by 
statute, IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (2008), as recognized in Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d 
657 (Ind. 2006); Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1985) (minor­
ity exception applies only to living minors); Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2002) (minority tOlling statute not available to deceased minor plaintiff); Campos v. 
Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc. (Campos 1/), 879 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App. 1994) (minority tolling 
provision only applicable in wrongful death cases); cf Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E. 2d 1107 
(Mass. 2005) (statute of repose was not tolled despite defendants' concealment of facts 
necessary for parents to bring wrongful death action); Baker v. Binder, 609 N.E.2d 1240 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (statute of limitations period commenced when father repre­
sented minor child in earlier action). 
78. MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7) (West 2000). 
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have placed the weight of their decisions.79 Courts applying the 
birthday rationale have considered the plain meaning of the statute 
at issue and decided that, by definition, a dead person cannot have 
a "birthday." Therefore, courts find these tolling provisions to be 
inapplicable.80 
1. Vance v. Henry Ford Health Systems 
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Vance v. Henry Ford Health 
Systems rejected both parties' arguments and interpretations of the 
relevant statutes.81 The relevant Michigan law provided that a 
plaintiff, absent exclusion, is required to file his claim within two 
years of its accrual.82 Additionally, Michigan law provides: 
If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or 
within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action 
which survives by law may be commenced by the personal repre­
sentative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after 
letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations 
has run. But an action shall not be brought under this provision 
unless the personal representative commences it within 3 years 
after the period of limitations has run.83 
The Vance family believed that it was entitled to an exclusion 
from the standard malpractice claim limitation and filed its case 
under the time limits prescribed by section 600.5851(7) of the Mich­
igan Compiled Laws,84 which states: 
[I]f, at the time a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a 
person under section 5838a the person has not reached his or her 
eighth birthday, a person shall not bring an action based on the 
claim unless the action is commenced on or before the person's 
tenth birthday or within the period of limitations set forth in sec­
tion 5838a, whichever is later.85 
79. See, e.g., Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d 78, 82-83 (Mich. Ct. 
App.2006). 
80. Id. 
81. Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 81-83. 
82. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(5) ("Except as otherwise provided in 
this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice."). 
83. /d. § 600.5852. 
84. Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 82. 
85. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7) (footnote omitted). Section 
600.5838a(2) states: 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, ... a claim based on 
medical malpractice may be commenced ... within the applicable period pre­
scribed in section 5805 or sections 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the 
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Intuitively, the plaintiffs believed their suit was timely, considering 
the facts that their son died before the age of eight, and that their 
suit was filed before his tenth birthday.86 
The defendants argued that the applicable statute was section 
600.5851(1) of Michigan Compiled Laws,87 which provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (7) and (8), if the 
person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under 
this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim 
accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 
1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, 
to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limi­
tations has run.88 
According to this section, the defendants reasoned, although 
Terron Vance was under the age of eighteen when the action ac­
crued, his death removed the disability, therefore rendering section 
600.5851(7) inapplicable. Thus, there was a one year statute of limi­
tations, subject to the appointment of an administrator under sec­
tion 600.5852 of Michigan Compiled Laws.89 Under the 
defendants' rationale, the Vances had until August 20, 2004, which 
was two years from the date the personal representative was ap­
pointed, to file suit.90 There was no dispute that the plaintiffs filed 
on September 13, 2004, two days before the tenth anniversary of 
Terron's birth, and thus the defendants argued that the claim was 
time barred.91 
The court was quick to dispose of the defendants' argument 
that section 600.5851 was controlling, stating that subsection (1) 
"unambiguously excludes medical malpractice actions from its 
scope by including language specifically referencing malpractice ac­
tions and the phrase, '[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsections 
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, which­
ever is later. However, except as otherwise provided in section 5851(7) or (8), 
the claim shall not be commenced later than 6 years after the date of the act or 
omission that is the basis for the claim .... A medical malpractice action that 
is not commenced within the time prescribed by this subsection is barred. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
86. See Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 81-82. 
87. Id. at 81. 
88. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(1). 
89. See Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 79-80. 
90. Id. at 79. 
91. See id. at 81. 
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(7) and (8)."'92 The court thus concluded that the action was gov­
erned by either section 5851(7)-the plaintiff's suggestion-or sec­
tion 5852-its own proposal-of the Michigan Compiled Laws.93 
Unfortunately for the Vances, the court did not find that sec­
tion 600.5851(7) was the appropriate limitation to be applied. How­
ever, more important than the outcome was the court's reasoning. 
The court followed a process of elimination, rather than one of in­
terpretation, in deciding the correct statute of limitation. 
Looking at the infancy tOlling provision suggested by the 
Vances, the court stated that, "[w]hen faced with questions of statu­
tory interpretation, the courts must discern and give effect to the 
Legislature's intent as expressed by the words in the statute."94 
With this in mind, the court reviewed what it understood to be the 
relevant clauses in the statute: "person has not reached his or her 
eighth birthday," and, "unless the action is commenced on or before 
the person's tenth birthday."95 The questions presented, then, were: 
(1) what does the word "birthday" mean; and (2) does "a deceased 
minor continue[] to age after death?"96 
Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the canons of 
statutory construction state that the court is to presume "that the 
Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed. "97 Without a 
definition of "birthday" given in the statute, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals turned to the plain meaning, finding three potential defini­
tions of "birthday." It could be the day marking the anniversary of 
a person's birth, the actual day of the person's birth, or a day that 
commemorated the beginning of a new thing.98 The court, how­
ever, was not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that "birthday" 
was meant to cut off rights based on the "anniversary" of the de­
ceased minor's birth.99 Instead, the court based its rationale on the 
word "reach."lOO Stating that the court "must give effect to every 
word, phrase, and clause in [the] statute and avoid an interpretation 
that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nuga­
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tory,"101 the court determined that a person who dies no longer has 
"the power, capacity, and ability to act," and thus cannot "reach" 
his tenth birthday.102 
In concluding that the section 600.5851(7) minority tolling pro­
vision did not apply, the Michigan Court of Appeals deduced that 
the personal administrator statute of limitation provision, section 
600.5852, was the controlling statute, thus barring an otherwise 
meritorious claim because it had been filed twenty-four days too 
late.103 
2. Campos v. Ysleta General Hospital 
Texas has a similar minority tolling provision to Michigan, 
which was interpreted to prevent the Campos family from bringing 
a suit on behalf of their son.104 Jose Angel Campos, Jr., was five 
years old when he was taken to Y sleta General Hospital by his 
mother and uncle.1°5 After being refused treatment for failure to 
demonstrate their ability to pay, they left for another medical treat­
ment center where they were told to fill out forms and remain in 
the waiting room until an exam room became available.l°6 Appar­
ently believing that this too was a denial of treatment, Ms. Campos 
and her brother-in-law went to a third treatment facility where Jose 
was seen by physician David Allen Smith for approximately thirty 
minutes before he was pronounced dead from respiratory arrest.107 
The Camposes brought a survival action against the hospital 
for their son's wrongful death. lOS The court held that the suit was 
101. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vega 
v. Lakeland Hosps. at Niles & St. Joseph, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 389 (2005)). 
102. See id. at 81, 83. 
103. Id. at 83. Under § 5852 the Vances would have had to file by August 20, 
2004. However they relied on 5851(7) and filed on September 13, 2004. Id. at 79. The 
tenth anniversary of Terron's birth was September 15, 2004. Id. 
104. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (re­
pealed 2003); Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc. (Campos II), 879 S.W.2d 67, 73 (Tex. 
App. 1994). 
105. Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc. (Campos I), 836 S:W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. 
App.1992). . 
106. See id. at 793; see also Campos lJ, 879 S.W.2d at 69. 
107. Campos I, 836 S.W.2d at 791; see also Campos II, 879 S.W.2d at 69. 
108. The Campos family brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the Ysleta 
General Hospital, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict 
for the defendant, stating that the "plaintiffs had presented no evidence that any act or 
omission of any defendant was a cause in fact of Jose Campos's death." Campos lJ, 879 
S.W.2d at 69. Subsequently, on August 19, 1991, almost three years after the death of 
their five year-old son, the Camposes filed another suit alleging a survival cause of 
action. See id. 
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frivolous in part because it was brought after the statute of limita­
tions had run.109 The Camposes appealed, maintaining that the in­
fancy tolling provision in the applicable statute of limitations 
allowed them to file suit up until Jose's fourteenth birthday.110 
They argued that the clause extending the period of limitation for 
minors under the age of twelve applied to their situation since their 
son was only five when he died.111 
The court rejected the position that the statute of limitations­
section lO.Ol-was applicable, holding that "[u]nder this argument 
... the statute of limitations would never run in a situation where a 
child dies and therefore never reaches the age of fourteen. "112 The 
court went on to state, without explanation, that "the tolling provi-
Survival causes of action are different from wrongful death actions in that the "law· 
suit [is] brought on behalf of a decedent's estate for injuries or damages incurred by the 
decedent immediately before dying." BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 1486. In contrast to a 
wrongful death action, which is an action that compensates the beneficiaries of the de­
cedent, a survival claim compensates the decedent's estate for the suffering of the dece­
dent. In this action, the Camposes were specifically alleging harm to their son, which 
occurred in the hours before his death. See Campos II, 879 S.W.2d at 73. The trial 
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, defendants having argued 
that the claim was barred both by res judicata and by the applicable two-year statute of 
limitations. See id. at 69. In Texas, res judicata will bar a suit if the subsequent suit 
"arises out of the same subject matter of a previous suit which through the exercise of 
diligence, could have been litigated in the prior suit." Id. at 73. Sanctions were im­
posed against the Camposes for filing a groundless suit, brought in bad faith for the 
purpose of harassment. !d. at 70, 72-73. 
109. The court was correct in determining that, had the plaintiffs put together a 
more complete argument in the original suit, both the wrongful death and survival suits 
could have been tried in one action; thus, the second suit was appropriately barred res 
judicata. Id. at 73. While the Camposes-or their attorney-arguably made poor 
choices regarding the filing of claims, what is more interesting is their argument on 
appeal regarding the imposition of sanctions. The plaintiffs argued that sanctions 
should not be imposed because their suit was not groundless, in bad faith, or filed for 
the purpose of harassment. Id. 
110. See id. At the time that Campos II was decided, the applicable statute of 
limitations was article 4590i, section 10.01 of Vernon's Texas Revised Civil Statutes 
Annotated: 
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be com­
menced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the 
breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the 
subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made com­
pleted; provided that, minors under the age of 12 years shall have until their 
14th birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, the claim. Except as 
herein provided, this subchapter applies to all persons regardless of minority 
or other legal disability. 
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (repealed 2003) 
(emphasis added). 
111. Campos II, 879 S.W.2d at 73. 
112. Id. 
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sions for children under twelve [were] clearly not meant to apply in 
wrongful death or survival cases. "113 Whether the Campos II suit 
would have warranted a damage award for the plaintiffs is some­
what of a moot point. More importantly, this case, like Vance, elim­
inates an avenue of recovery for parents seeking justice for their 
deceased children. 
3. 	 Holt v. Lenko and Awve v. Physicians Insurance Co. of 
Wisconsin, Inc. 
In Holt v. Lenko, the plaintiff, like the Campos family, brought 
a claim for the death of her son.114 Nicole Holt, pregnant and in 
labor, was admitted to Butler Memorial Hospital in Pennsylvania 
on December 4, 1994.115 She gave birth to her son Andrew on De­
cember 5, 1994, and he died later that same day.116 Holt filed her 
complaint on October 29, 1999, alleging that the negligence of the 
defendant hospital and doctors in their treatment of both mother 
and child caused Andrew's death.!17 
Holt sought to recover damages under two different Penn­
sylvania statutes, one governing wrongful death actions and the 
other survival actions.118 On appeal, although the plaintiff con­
ceded the wrongful death claim to be untimely, she maintained her 
argument that the survival action was timely filed.1 19 In Penn­
sylvania, the survival statute provides that in the case where a de­
ceased person had a cause of action at the time of death, the action 
survives the death of the plaintiff and the administrator or executor 
of the estate may then bring suit to recover.120 Furthermore, the 
survival statute was interpreted to provide that "the statute of limi­
tations begins to run on the date of the injury, as though the dece­
dent were bringing his or her own lawsuit."121 
Holt's argument was strengthened by the Pennsylvania minor­
ity tolling provision, which provides that "[i]f an individual entitled 
to bring a civil action is an unemancipated minor at the time the 
113. Id. 
114. Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
115. Id. at 1213. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id.; see also 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b}(I}(i} (West 2007) (minority tolling 
provision); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (West 2004) (survival statute). 
119. Holt, 791 A.2d at 1213-14. The trial judge, on the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, originally dismissed both claims as untimely. Id. at 1213. 
120. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302. 
121. Holt, 791 A.2d at 1215. 
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cause of action accrues," then "[s]uch person shall have the same 
time for commencing an action after attaining majority as is allowed 
to others by the provisions of this subchapter."122 The statute fur­
ther defines "minor" as "any individual who has not yet attained 18 
years of age."123 
Under both the survival statute and the tolling provision for 
minors, Holt argued on appeal that she had from the time of the 
original negligence-the day Andrew died-until he would have 
reached the age of majority eighteen years later.u4 Based on the 
aim of the Pennsylvania survival statute and the minority tolling 
provision, Holt reasoned that her son would have had a right to file 
a negligence claim for the alleged malpractice of his doctors sur­
rounding his birth until age eighteen, and that his right passed to 
her upon his death as the administrator of his estate.125 
The court did not agree with Holt's argument, and she was left 
with no recourse against the doctors or hospital. Relying on the 
plain meaning of the statute, the court held that "[t]here is nothing 
in the statutory language that would indicate that the legislature 
intended that the minority tolling statute would be available to a 
deceased minor plaintiff. "126 Without discussing how it reached this 
conclusion, the court claimed that it found support for its holding in 
Wisconsin case law.u7 
In Awve v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., parents 
faced similar circumstances as Holt when their son died at the very 
young age of thirty-two weeks, all of which he had spent in the hos­
pital.128 His parents waited just over four years before filing a med­
ical malpractice claim that included both wrongful death and 
survival actions.129 
In Wisconsin, the tolling provision of the statute of limitations 
for minors' personal injury actions resulting from medical care re­
quires the action to be filed within time limitations of section 
122. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1}(i}. 
123. [d. § 5533(b)(1}(ii). 
124. See Holt, 791 A.2d at 1215 (noting that as a survival action, the action sur­
vives the death of the victim and "may be brought by the administrator of the dece­
dent's estate to recover the loss to the estate resulting from the tort"). 
125. [d. at 1213-14. 
126. [d. at 1214. 
127. [d. 
128. Awve v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 512 N.W.2d 216, 216 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1994); see also Holt, 791 A.2d at 1212 (similar factual situation). 
129. See Awve, 512 N.W.2d at 217-18. 
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893.55,130 or "by the time that person reaches the age of 10 years, 
whichever is later."131 The Awve family relied on both the latter 
provision and section 895.01, which provides "that a decedent's per­
sonal injury action survives the decedent's death."132 Using both of 
these statutes, the Awves apparently believed that their action had 
nearly ten years to be filed; therefore, filing after only four years 
was, as they understood it, both timely and diligent.133 
During the time between the alleged malpractice and the time 
of filing, the family took numerous steps to investigate the death of 
their son in anticipation of filing a lawsuit.134 In early 1991, the 
parents retained a lawyer and began reviewing medical records with 
two different doctors, one of whom stated that, "had [ the mother] 
been diagnosed by [her doctor] in a timely fashion as being in labor 
and had attempts been made by [her] to arrest the labor, those at­
tempts in all probability would have been successful."135 
Thus, despite evidence that the Awves's case was one of legiti­
mate medical malpractice, or at least a question for a jury, the court 
dismissed the case.136 The court stated that because of the lack of 
cross reference between the survival statute and the minority tolling 
provision, it needed only to look to section 893.56 (the minority 
tolling provision) to determine the outcome of the Awves's ap­
peal.137 The court held that the statute was "unambiguous."138 
Looking to the clause, "by the time that person reaches the age of 
10 years," the court held that "reaches" was the operative word, 
and that in order to "reach" an age, a minor must be living.139 The 
130. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 2006). Section 893.55 states in relevant part: 
[A]n action to recover damages for injury arising from any treatment or oper­
ation performed by ... a person who is a health care provider, regardless of 
the theory on which the action is based, shall be commenced within the later 
of: 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered ... except that an 
action may not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission. 
Id. § 893.55(lm). 
131. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.56; see also Awve, 512 N.W.2d at 218. 
132. Awve, 512 N.W.2d at 218 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.01). 
133. See id. at 217-18. 
134. See id. 




139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.56 
(West 2006». 
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court then opined that had the legislature intended for deceased 
minors to be included within the tolling provision, the legislature 
would have added something to the effect of, "'by the time the mi­
nor reaches or would have reached' the age of 10 years."140 
Like Holt, the Awves were left without remedy against the 
doctors or the hospital. The Pennsylvania court in Holt used the 
Wisconsin court's decision in Awve as persuasive authority.141 
However, neither court entertained alternate interpretations, sim­
ply stating that the parents' interpretations were incorrect and the 
statutes were unambiguous. Furthermore, the Court in Holt failed 
even to establish how its own legislature's intent was furthered by 
its interpretation, deferring instead to Wisconsin case law. The 
Pennsylvania statute is substantially different from the Wisconsin 
statute: the word "reach" never appears within the language of the 
statute.142 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania court incorrectly relied 
on Wisconsin case law and failed to effectively interpret its own 
statute. 
4. Bailey v. Martz 
Thirteen-year-old Mark Bailey was riding his dirt bike when he 
was tragically struck by a train rendering him a quadriplegic.143 
Tragedy only continued for Mark during his stay at the hospital. 
On July 11, 1979, the heart monitor that Mark was wearing mal­
functioned and severely burned him.144 After his release on May 
28, 1980, Mark experienced breathing problems and was taken back 
to the hospital.145 He was released only to stop breathing again two 
days later.146 As a result of this, Mark entered into a coma and died 
on June 14, 1980.147 
Because the train failed to blow its whistle, Mark's father re­
tained an attorney to represent him and his son in all possible 
claims resulting from the accident and the subsequent medical mal­
140. ld. 
141. See Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1214-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
142. Compare 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1)(i) (West 2007), with WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 893.56. 
143. Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), superseded by 
statute, IND. CODE § 34·23-2-1 (2008), as recognized in Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d 
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practice.148 However, this attorney failed to take any action, includ­
ing filing a claim against the train company, causing Mr. Bailey to 
discharge him and retain new counsel.149 Mr. Bailey hired new 
counsel on. November 11, 1981.150 However, after learning that 
they were in possession of the claim when the applicable statute 
had run, the new counsel withdrew from the case for fear of being 
sued for malpractice for having failed to file the claim,151 Mr. Bai­
ley did not retain new counsel until June 14, 1982.152 
In this case, the defendants were the second set of lawyers that 
Mr. Bailey had hired to represent him.153 They were granted sum­
mary judgment, and on appeal argued that Mark's claim was not 
barred by the statute of limitations while they represented him.154 
The defendants relied on Indiana Code section 34-1-2-5, stating that 
"one who is under legal disability when the cause of action accrues 
may bring his action within two years after the disability is re­
moved."155 The attorneys argued that sixteen-year-old Mark fell 
into this category because a legal disability, for the purposes of the 
Indiana statute, includes those minors under the age of eighteen.156 
Under this rationale the claim did not expire while in their hands. 
While different from the previous cases where plaintiff parents 
relied on the tolling provisions even after their child's death, the 
defendants here tried to use the same rationale to escape legal mal­
practice liability. However, the Indiana court, like the others, 
found the language of the statute instructive and threw out the at­
torneys' interpretation.157 
The Court of Appeals of Indiana held that the legal disabil­
ity-minority-was removed by death and that the defendants' in­
terpretation of the statute of limitations extending two years 
beyond the date of his eighteenth birthday was incorrect.15s The 
court specifically noted the gross unfairness of its interpretation by 




151. Jd. at 718-19. 
152. Jd. at 719. 
153. See id. at 716, 718-19. 
154. Jd. at 722. 
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tations would have been tolled until July 28, 1982, his 18th birthday. 
Because Mark did not live, however, his right to recover damages 
... passed on his death ...."159 This Indiana court, like the others, 
dismissed the possibility of an alternative interpretation and left 
parents of children like Mark without the hope of litigating their 
claims beyond the personal representative time limitations. 
B. Legislative Intent Rationale 
In addition to looking to the plain meaning of the minority toll­
ing statutes, several courts have delved deeper, finding that even if 
the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, an interpretation 
that protects hospitals and doctors is the accurate reading of the 
tolling provision.160 This line of reasoning not only unfairly pro­
tects defendants, but is based on what could be a false idea that the 
health care and insurance industries need protection from litigious 
Americans. 
1. Randolph v. Methodist Hospitals, Inc. 
On October 7, 1991, Kwabene Randolph was born.161 He suf­
fered from an anoxic brain injury and had severe breathing difficul­
ties and seizures until his death on May 7, 1992.162 On September 
26, 1997, his mother, Charlotte Randolph, filed a medical malprac­
tice claim under Indiana law claiming that the wrongful death of 
her son was due to the failure of the medical providers to diagnose 
his "severe fetal distress, ... thereby resulting in Kwabene's severe 
asphyxia, seizures, and ultimately, his premature death."163 
The trial court dismissed the mother's claims, holding that al­
though they were properly brought on behalf of her son, they were 
time barred by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, which, al­
though since declared unconstitutional, stated: 
A claim, whether in contract or tort, may not be brought 
against a health care provider ... unless the claim is filed within 
two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neg­
159. [d. 
160. See Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003); Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428, 429 (N.M. 1985); Brown v. 
Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1998). 
161. Randolph, 793 N.E.2d at 233. 
162. [d. 
163. [d. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Appellants' Brief at 4, Ran­
dolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 45A03-021O­
CV-371), available at 2003 WL 25266492). 
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lect, except that a minor less than six (6) years of age has until 
the minor's eighth birthday to file. l64 
Randolph relied on the last clause of the Act, believing that 
her claim was timely because her child died before the age of six, 
and, as such, would have been able to file his own claim until he 
turned eight.165 However the court found that the first clause of the 
Act's limitation on action applied to the Randolph's claim, and be­
cause it was not filed within two years of her son's death, it was 
dismissed.166 
Without discussing Indiana's own statute, the court found the 
decision of the Superior Court in Pennsylvania in Holt and the 
holding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Awve persuasive and 
applicable to its own case.167 The court noted that even if the lan­
.; 	 guage of the statute was ambiguous, the interpretation favoring a 
narrower reading of the statute "properly gives effect to the intent 
of the legislature."168 
The court reasoned that interpreting the statute to include de­
ceased children would defeat the enactment of the Medical Mal­
practice Act because its purpose was "to provide health care 
providers with some protection from malpractice claims in order to 
preserve the availability of medical services for the public health 
and well-being."169 Further, the legislation was in response to in­
creasing .insurance premiums at a time when "some doctors were 
already unable to afford malpractice insurance."17o Including de­
ceased minors in the exception from the two-year limitation would 
expand liability for providers.l7l The fact that the court refused to 
allow the claim to go forward for fear that insurance premiums 
would be affected seems only to support the notion that parents 
like the Randolphs have valid claims for which they should receive 
compensation. 
164. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-7-1(b) (West 1999), invalidated by Booth v. Wiley, 
839 N.E.2d 1168 (Ind. 2005). 
165. Randolph, 793 N.E.2d at 234. 
166. Id. 
167. /d. 	at 235. 
168. Id. 	at 236. 
169. Id. (citing Sue Yee Lee v. Lafayette Home Hosp., Inc., 410 N.E.2d 1319, 
1324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). 
170. Id. 	(citing Lee, 410 N.E.2d at 1323). 
171. Id. 
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2. 	 Brown v. Shwarts and Regents of University of New 
Mexico v. Armijo 
Christina Brown entered the emergency room at Navarro Me­
morial Hospital in Texas during her third trimester, complaining of 
nausea, headaches, cough, and wetness in her pants. l72 She was 
given a hepatitis shot, prescribed a sonogram, and told "to return to 
the hospital if her symptoms worsened."173 Days later, Christina 
returned to the hospital and was seen by another doctor, who told 
her that she had been leaking amniotic fluid for several days.174 
She subsequently gave birth to a premature baby boy, who died two 
days later. 175 
The Browns filed a medical malpractice claim against the hos­
pital and the first doctor who saw Christina.176 The defendants 
countered that the claim was time-barred under the Medical Liabil­
ity and Insurance Improvement Act, which states: 
[N]o health care liability claim may be commenced unless the ac­
tion is filed within two years from the occurrence of the ... medi­
cal ... treatment that is the subject of the claim ... provided that, 
minors under the age of 12 years shall have until their 14th birth­
day in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, the claim.l77 
The Browns believed their claims were filed well before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations because the claim was based 
on the death of their child, who died under the age of twelve. Once 
again, this court, like so many others, was asked to answer the ques­
tion, "if the child dies after being born, when does [the statute of] 
limitations [begin to] run?"178 
The Texas Supreme Court held, as others have, that the wrong­
ful death claim is barred by the statute of limitations if it is not filed 
within two years and rejected the idea that the parents could invoke 
the minority tolling provision.179 Holding that "[l]imitations on a 
wrongful death action based on negligent health care is not tolled 
or extended because the decedent was a minor" and that, "'the toll­
ing provision ... that applies to a minor does not apply to an adult's 





177. ld. (quoting TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon 1977) 
(repealed 2003». 
178. [d. 
179. ld. at 333-34. 
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wrongful death claims,''' the court acknowledged that this interpre­
tation could result in harsh outcomes.180 However, the court rea­
soned that the legislature was free to place any limitations on the 
period in which a wrongful death suit may be brought, reminding 
the plaintiffs that the cause of action was a creature of statute, and 
the right to file a wrongful death suit did not exist at common 
law.181 Accordingly, the court held that the Browns filed their 
claim one day too late.182 
Similar to Brown, in Regents of University of New Mexico v. 
Armijo, the Armijo family also lost its infant son.183 However, be­
cause the hospital was a government entity, the Armijos filed their 
claim under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act of 1978, which 
provides: 
Actions against a governmental entity ... for torts shall be 
forever barred, unless such action is commenced within two years 
after the date of the occurrence resulting in loss, injury, or death, 
except that a minor under the full age of seven years shall have 
until his ninth birthday in which to file. 184 
The Court of Appeals held that the Armijos could invoke the 
minority tolling provision on behalf of their deceased son because 
the Tort Claims Act included wrongful death suits.18s 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico overturned the Court of 
Appeals, holding "that the Legislature intended to allow only living 
minors under the age of seven years additional time in which to 
prosecute actions for loss or injury."186 The court held that inter­
preting the statute to apply only to living minors was the most logi­
cal conclusion and reasoned that the Court of Appeals' 
interpretation would broaden the statute by "convert[ing] the two­
year limitations period ... into a possible nine-year limitations pe­
riod. "187 Such broadening, the court stated, would "undermine the 
Legislature's intent to ... protect to some extent the State's finan­
cial resources from stale claims."188 




183. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1985). 
184. Id. at 429 (quoting N.M. STAT. § 41-4-15(A) (1977)). 
185. Armijo v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 704 P.2d 437, 441-42 (N.M. App. 1984), 
rev'd in part, 704 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1985). 
186. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 704 P.2d at 429. 
187. See id. at 430. 
188. See id. 
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Legislative intent has been a rationale in these courts' deci­
sions to disallow otherwise valid claims as untimely. Whether the 
statute was passed because of a perceived medical malpractice in­
surance crisis or as a way to limit a state's liability, these courts have 
systematically denied parents a way to enforce justice against the 
medical community. These decisions "force parents to file malprac­
tice actions within the two-year statutory period without full knowl­
edge of the possible negligence visited on their children. Parents 
should not be required to file premature lawsuits on behalf of their 
children."189 
C. Statutes of Repose Add Additional Problems for Minors 
Several states, including Massachusetts, add an additional ca­
veat known as a statute of repose to their statute of limitations on 
medical malpractice tort actions.190 A statute of repose sets a defin­
itive time limit after which no suit can be brought to court, even if 
the plaintiff does not learn of the injury until after the time limit has 
lapsed.191 The relevant statute of repose in Massachusetts states 
that 
any claim by a minor against a health care provider ... whether 
in contract or tort, based on an alleged act, omission, or neglect 
shall be commenced within three years from the date the cause of 
action accrues, except that a minor under the full age of six years 
shall have until his ninth birthday in which the action may be 
commenced, but in no event shall any such action be commenced 
more than seven years after occurrence of the act or omission 
192 
These statutes have sparked questions of constitutionality193 
and have also presented problems for parent-plaintiffs who have 
lost a child due to medical malpractice yet did not learn of the neg­
ligence until after the seven-year limit, or who have attempted to 
rely on the "ninth birthday"194 language to bring a suit that would 
otherwise be dismissed because of the repose limitation. 
189. Id. (Sosa, J., dissenting). 
190. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006). 
191. BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 1451. 
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D. 
193. See generally Mantell, supra note 44. 
194. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D. 
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1. 	 Baker v. Binder and the Intent of the Massachusetts 
Legislature 
On January 18, 1982, Angelique Baker's father brought a suit 
on her behalf alleging that the doctor's negligence during her birth 
ultimately required surgical removal of a portion of her small intes­
tine.195 Later, in May of 1987, he commenced a secoI1d suit relating 
to additional negligence on the day of his daughter's birth, includ­
ing negligent supervision by the hospital, failure to diagnose his 
daughter's condition, and negligent postoperative administration of 
a feeding tube.196 Although the second suit was dismissed for rea­
sons unrelated to the minority savings provision, the court took the 
opportunity to explain the purpose and history of the statute of 
repose.197 
In response to concerns about the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance in the early 1970s, Massachusetts, like many other states, 
enacted legislation to attempt to limit the number of malpractice 
claims.l98 It did so by placing special restrictions, which are not 
otherwise applicable to tort actions, on medical malpractice 
claims.199 Until 1976, the statute of limitations for actions by mi­
nors did not begin to run until the minor reached the age of major­
ity.2OO However, in 1976 the legislature shortened the period in 
which an action by a minor could be brought to three years, with 
the exception that a minor under the age of six had until his ninth 
birthday to commence a lawsuit.201 
The apparent purpose of the limited time period was to dispirit 
claims after an unreasonable amount of time had passed, thus in­
creasing the difficulty of defending the claims and causing increased 
medical malpractice insurance premiums.202 The court does not 
mention how it would be equally difficult to pursue a claim after a 
long passage of time, nor does it address the difficult situation in 
which an injury is not discovered until after the statute of limita­
tions has run. The problems created by Massachusetts's shortened 
195. Baker v. Binder, 609 N.E.2d 1240, 1241 & n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
196. Id. at 1241 & n.5. 
197. Id. at 1241-42. 
198. Id. at 1242. 
199. Id. 
200. Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 7 (1972) (repealed 1975). 
201. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006). 
202. Baker, 609 N.E.2d at 1242 (citing Austin v. Boston Univ. Hosp., 262 N.E.2d 
515 (Mass. 1977). 
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statute of limitation are highlighted in the case of Joslyn v. 
Chang.203 
2. Joslyn v. Chang and the Problem of Statutes of Repose 
Sen tree Joslyn was diagnosed with a rare metabolic disorder 
when she was seven months 01d.204 She could not tolerate nourish­
ment and experienced weakness and a general failure to thrive.20s 
In October 1992, she was taken to Children's Hospital Boston, 
where doctors discovered that fluid had built up around her en­
larged heart.206 A resident, supervised by Dr. Chang, performed 
surgery to drain the fluid.207 During the surgery, however, the resi­
dent punctured Sentree's heart and coronary artery.20S Sentree lost 
a significant amount of blood, which ultimately contributed to her 
death.209 
The death certificate signed by the resident stated that the 
death was naturally caused, and neither he nor Dr. Chang told the 
plaintiffs that their daughter's heart had been punctured during sur­
gery.210 Instead, the doctors informed the family that Sentree's 
"heart was 'too weak to withstand the procedure."'211 Moreover, 
the plaintiffs were never made aware of autopsy results or medical 
records, but were told that "records were not sent to patients be­
cause the materials would contain incomprehensible medical 
terms."212 
The Joslyns were unaware of the negligence of the resident 
performing the surgery until nine years later, in 2001, when, at the 
suggestion of Sentree's pediatrician, the Joslyns obtained all the 
medical records and learned of the surgical negligence.213 Follow­
ing their disturbing discovery, the Joslyns filed suit, which was dis­
missed as untimely under the Massachusetts statute of repose 
relating to medical malpractice claims.214 
203. Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 2005). 
204. ld. at 1108. 
205. ld. 
206. ld. 
207. ld. at 1108-09. 






214. /d. at 1108; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006). 
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The court pointed to previous case law stating that the statute 
of repose is an absolute time limit with the effect of placing a "limit 
on the liability of those within its protection and to abolish a plain­
tiff's cause of action thereafter, even if the plaintiff's injury does not 
occur, or is not discovered, until after the statute's time limit has 
expired."215 This limitation was enacted by the legislature in re­
sponse to mounting litigation relating to medical malpractice in an 
effort to reduce the number of claims that could be filed. It was 
developed after a 1986 report by a special commission that "ad­
dress[ed] a 'crisis ... in Massachusetts medical professional liability 
insurance.' "216 The commission stated that malpractice claims had 
increased by fifty percj;!nt in the last six months of 1981.217 The Jos­
lyn court traced this incline back to the 1980 case Franklin v. Albert 
that held that the action for malpractice accrued, "when the plain­
tiff learn[ed], or reasonably should have learned, that he ha[d] been 
harmed by the defendant's conduct."218 This "discovery" rule re­
placed the previous rule that the action accrued at the time of the 
alleged malpractice.219 
Although the court linked the jump in malpractice claims to 
the adoption of the discovery rule, the special commission noted 
that the reasons for the jump were "still unexplained."220 Further­
more, the special commission downplayed the connection, claiming 
that it had "no information suggesting that such an increase has oc­
curred or will OCCUr."221 Interestingly, the Massachusetts legislature 
has proposed legislation that, if passed, would eliminate the age and 
time limitation,222 which suggests that there is not a link between 
the malpractice actions and the Franklin decision. It also gives way 
for future cases like Joslyn to be fairly adjudicated. 
215. Joslyn, 837 N.E.2d at 1110 (quoting McGuinness v. Cotter, 591 N.E.2d 659, 
662 (Mass. 1992». 
216. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 174-5355, Reg. Sess., at 5 
(Mass. 1986». 
217. Id. at 1111. 
218. Id. at 1110 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot­
ing Franklin v. Albert, 411 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Mass. 1980». 
219. See Pasquale v. Chandler, 215 N.E.2d 319 (Mass. 1966), overruled by Frank­
lin, 411 N.E.2d 263. 
220. Joslyn, 837 N.E.2d at 1111 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting H.R. Doc. 
No. 174-5355, Reg. Sess., at 5). 
221. Id. at 1110-11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 
173-5980, Reg. Sess., at 17 (Mass. 1983»; see also infra IV.B.3. 
222. H.R. 1341, 185th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007). 
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IV. FLAWED RATIONALE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
While courts have justified dismissing otherwise valid claims 
brought by parents wishing to invoke the minority tolling provisions 
on several grounds, the outcomes have all been the same. Whether 
based on plain language, statutory interpretation, or legislative in­
tent and history, the holdings of the courts have denied recovery to 
parents seeking compensation from those who have contributed to 
the death of their children. These parents deserve the chance to 
litigate their claims beyond the typical two year statute of limitation 
and there is justification for allowing them to do so. These are 
questions of statutory interpretation and public policy, and, while 
there is not one answer that can accommodate each of the states' 
issues, there is at least another side to the story. 
A. How the Birthday Rationale Is Flawed 
1. The Plain Meaning Approach 
When required to determine the correct interpretation of a 
statute, a court first looks to the plain meaning of the words for 
guidance.223 Under this technique, "it is assumed that the legisla­
ture probably used the words ... in a 'normal' way to communicate 
its intent ...."224 The term "birthday" has more than one meaning, 
as recognized by the court in Vance. 225 Under the Random House 
definition it can mean, "the anniversary of a birth .... [or] the day 
of a person's birth."226 The Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, too, 
gives both the anniversary of a birth, and the day of a person's birth 
as possible definitions.227 The Vance court chose not to determine 
the appropriate definition of "birthday," and instead found that the 
term "reach" was determinative.228 Finding that a deceased child 
could not effectively "reach" ten years of age, the court determined 
that the legislature had not intended the tolling provision to apply 
to claims brought on behalf of deceased children.229 
While the court was proper in looking to the word "reach" for 
guidance, it failed to determine the plain meaning of "birthday." 
223. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTER­
PRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 38 (2002). 
224. [d. 
225. See Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d. 78, 82 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2006). . 
226. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICDONARY 134 (2d ed. 1997). 
227. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S, supra note 11, at 126. 
228. Vance, 726 N.W.2d. at 82. 
229. [d. at 82-83. 
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The generally accepted canons of statutory construction assume 
that each word has meaning; therefore, an interpretation that would 
make some words meaningless should be rejected.230 The Vance 
interpretation arguably renders the word "birthday" meaningless. 
The statute states that if at the time of the alleged malpractice a 
"person has not reached his or her eighth birthday, a .person shall 
not bring an action based on the claim unless the action is com­
menced on or before the person's tenth birthday."231 The court re­
jected a construction that would interpret birthday to mean the 
anniversary of birth. The only other "plain meaning" alternative is 
an interpretation of "birthday" as the day on which a person is 
born. Assuming the court had adopted this definition, the statute 
would seem to mean that a person is only entitled to the exception 
if she has not yet reached "the day of a person's birth." Not only 
does this interpretation render the term "birthday" useless in the 
statute, but it would seem to apply only to fetuses or actions by 
mothers for babies in utero. 
The more logical interpretation is to interpret "birthday" to 
mean the anniversary of one's birth. This is the meaning most often 
used in everyday conversation and is consistent with the canons of 
interpretation. To decipher legislative intent the court is to "as­
sume[] that the legislature probably used the words ... in a 'nor­
mal' way" and give the words "the meaning that they would 
ordinarily produce."232 For example, one might say, "Today is Lin­
coln's birthday." Although Abraham Lincoln died on April 15, 
1865, we celebrate the anniversary of the day of his birth on Febru­
ary 12th of each year.233 Using this common definition, the Michi­
gan statute would be interpreted to mean that if a minor has not 
reached the eighth anniversary of his birth, he is entitled to the 
exception. 
Similarly, the Pennsylvania court in Holt found persuasive a 
Wisconsin case that held that in order to "reach" a particular age, a 
minor must be living.234 However, the Holt court did not ade­
quately interpret its own statute before importing Wisconsin case 
230. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 223, at 84. 
231. MICH. COMPo LAWS. ANN. § 600.5851(7) (West 2000); see also Vance, 726 
N.W.2d. at 82. 
232. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 224, at 38. 
233. President Abraham Lincoln was born on February 12, 1809. The White 
House, Biography of Abraham Lincoln, http://www.whitehouse.govlhistory/presidents/ 
a116.html (last visited April 15, 2009). 
234. Holt V. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citing Awve V. 
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 512 N.W.2d 216, 218-19 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994». 
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law. The relevant Pennsylvania statute in Holt stated that a minor 
entitled to bring a claim who has not yet attained the age of eigh­
teen "shall have the same time for commencing an action after at­
taining majority."235 Under a plain-meaning interpretation, this 
clause alone does not permit the parents of a deceased child to file 
a suit invoking the child's minority savings provision. Looking 
solely at this sentence, it is clear that a deceased child could never 
reach the age of eighteen; thus, parents are barred from invoking 
the statute if their child dies. 
However, the last clause of the statute, which the Holt court 
fails to emphasize, states that for the purposes of the infancy provi­
sion, a minor is defined as, "any individual who has not yet attained 
eighteen years of age."236 Importing this statutory definition of a 
minor into the tolling provision, it would seem that any person, liv­
ing or dead, who has not yet attained the age of eighteen is a minor 
and can, as a result, rely on the statute.237 




In Campos, the court dismissed the idea that the Texas legisla­
ture could have intended the minority savings provision to apply to 
deceased minors because it reasoned that a dead child ceases to 
age.238 The court summarized the plaintiff's position, stating that 
"[u]nder this argument ... the statute of limitations would never 
run in a situation where a child dies and therefore never reaches the 
age fourteen."239 Yet, after death, a child ceases aging but does not 
cease having birthdays. Under the plain meaning, a birthday is an 
anniversary of one's birth; thus, a dead child will continue to have 
birthdays, as does any living child.240 Therefore, the fourteenth an­
niversary of the dead child's birth would mark the running of the 
235. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 5533(b)(1)(i) (West 2004)). 
236. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). 
237. For an alternative interpretation of the decision in Holt, see Christina Gil­
lotti, Note, Superior Court Interprets Minority Tolling Statute: Statute Does Not Apply to 
Estate ofMinors Who Do Not Survive Injury, ALLEGHENY COUNTY B. ASS'N. L.J., Mar. 
2002, at 2; William M. Green, From the ACBA: Death of Minor Plaintiff Kills Hope of 
Tolling Statute of Limitations, ALLEGHENY COUNTY B. ASS'N. L.J., Oct. 2002, at 4. 
238. Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc. (Campos II), 879 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App. 
1994). 
239. Id. at 73. 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 226-227. 
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statute of limitations and satisfy the Campos court's concern of the 
endless statute of limitations. 
Additionally, even when a court concludes that the plain­
meaning interpretation requires that a child must be leaving to 
reach a birthday, there exists a "golden rule" that could save a par­
ent's claim. The golden-rule exception to the plain-meaning inter­
pretation states that where the plain meaning produces a result that 
is ridiculous or unjust, the judge may determine that the legislature 
could not have intended such a result and reject the interpreta­
tion.241 Early on, this meant that a judge could simply set aside a 
statute when its plain meaning produced an injustice.242 However, 
today the rule is more limited: when the rule applies, the plain 
meaning is not determinative.243 Instead, the court must turn to 
legislative intent, the purpose for which the statute was passed, and 
the context in which it was passed.244 
B. 	 Judicial Determinations of Legislative Intent Have Focused on 
the Wrong Issue 
Whereas the courts discussed have cited to their own states' 
perceived medical malpractice litigation crises as the reason for the 
enactment of statutes shortening the limitations period, there is a 
more focused point of each statute that relates directly to minors. 
The pressing issue, which the courts have not directly addressed, is 
why the exception for minors exists in this type of statute. If the 
reasons for the exception to the rule exist regardless of whether the 
child survived, then there is good reason to allow the exception to 
hold even if the child has died. 
1. 	 Reasons for Limiting Medical Malpractice Actions 
In response to an insurance crisis during the 1970s that had 
caused physicians to limit their practices, retire early, and refuse 
patients, Texas passed the Medical Liability Insurance Improve­
ment Act (MLIIA).245 In determining cases such as Brown, the 
241. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 223, at 40-41; see also Shapiro v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 1,31 (1948) (explaining that "the 'plain meaning' rule [must] give way 
where its application would produce a futile result, or an unreasonable result"). 
242. 	 BROWN & BROWN, supra note 223, at 41. 
243. 	 [d. 
244. [d. at 42-48; see also McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861 
(2005) ("Examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes up 
the daily fare of every appellate court in the country."). 
245. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01 (1977) (repealed 2003); see 
also Hamrick, supra note 31, at 132. 
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courts have listed these reasons for enacting th~ statute and have 
remarked on the intent of the legislature to limit physician liability 
and thus decrease insurance premiums by limiting the time period 
in which a medical malpractice action could be filed.246 In enacting 
the MLIIA, the expressed goals of the Texas legislature included: 
"(1) reducing frequency and severity of health care liability claims; 
(2) decreasing the costs of malpractice insurance; (3) protecting 
health care providers from liability through affordable insurance; 
and (4) ensuring the public access to affordable health care."247 
The Brown court apparently inferred from these goals that the leg­
islature did not intend that parents of deceased minors be able to 
invoke the minority tolling provision, rationalizing that this would 
only result in more cases.248 
Similarly, Massachusetts courts have followed the same line of 
interpretation in determining legislative intent. In 1986, the Massa­
chusetts legislature amended its own medical malpractice statute to 
include a seven-year statute of repose for minors. 249 The statute 
was a response to insurers threatening to withdraw from the mal­
practice market and refusing to insure physicians. Even though the 
bill's sponsors stated that the insurers were reacting to a national 
trend of high settlements for medical malpractice claims, they main­
tained that the further limitations on a minor's ability to bring 
claims would effectively ensure the availability of physicians' insur­
ance.250 The statutes of repose and further limitation of minors' 
rights were enacted to curb malpractice litigation and ensure af­
fordable health care and insurance.251 The Massachusetts courts 
have held that allowing a claim like that in Joslyn to go forward 
would defeat the statute's purpose.252 
The state of Indiana allows the parent of a deceased child to 
bring a wrongful death claim and "recover for the loss of that 
child's services, love, care and affection, as well as health care, hos­
pitalization, funeral and burial expenses," among other things.253 
Under this statute a parent may file suit and be awarded damages, 
246. See Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Tex. 1998); see also Hamrick, 
supra note 31, at 132. 
247. Hamrick, supra note 31, at 137. 
248. See generally Brown, 968 S.W. 2d 331. 
249. Mantell, supra note 44, at 100. 
250. ld. at 99. 
251. See Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107, 110-11 (Mass. 2005). 
252. See id. 
253. Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003). 
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at "any time between the death of the child and the date the child 
would have reached twenty years of age."254 The Court in Ran­
dolph, however, made the distinction that the wrongful death stat­
ute does not apply in an action where the wrongful death resulted 
from medical malpractice, instead applying the medical malpractice 
statute and shortening the limitations period.255 
This inequity is based solely on the manner in which the child 
died. The parent of a child who died, not as a result of medical 
malpractice, but from some other negligence could wait until the 
child would have reached twenty. Yet, the parent of a child who 
died from a physician's negligence may be denied the same benefit. 
Furthermore, the tolling provision in and of itself should be 
determinative of the intent of each state's respective legislature. 
While this history of the insurance atmosphere in the 1970s may be 
helpful in determining why medical malpractice limitation statutes 
were enacted initially, it misses the mark regarding claims for the 
wrongful death of children. There are specific provisions within 
each of the statutes that refer to a minor's right to toll the otherwise 
applicable limitations period. The rationale behind including a mi­
nority tolling provision, instead of the reasons for limiting malprac­
tice litigation, should be the focus of interpretation. 
2. The Intent of the Savings Provisions 
Children need more legal protection than other classes.256 
From drinking ages to driver's licenses, states have widely recog­
nized this concept in various aspects of the law. With regard to 
personal injury, Texas has traditionally been protective of its mi­
nors: "[T]he numerous Texas statutes allowing minors to toll the 
commencement of limitations until they attain majority evidence a 
legislative view that minors are incapable of filing claims while 
under a disability."257 
However, there are reasons beyond a minor's incapacity to file 
for tolling the statute of limitations. As pointed out by the dissent 
in Regents of University of New Mexico v. Armijo, forcing parents 
to file suit within a two-year limitation period would force claims to 
be filed without full knowledge of the scope of the harm visited on 
254. [d.; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-23-2-1 (2008). 
255. Randolph, 793 N.E.2d at 237. 
256. Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (quoting Robinson 
v. Pa. Hosp., 737 A.2d 291 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999». 
257. Hamrick, supra note 31, at 175. 
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their child.258 Under this rationale it is possible that more, not 
fewer, frivolous lawsuits would be filed, based on a jump-the-gun 
mentality. Parents could feel pressured to file any claim, for fear 
that waiting to discover all facts related to their child's death would 
result in a total bar on recovery. 
Additionally, minors are also given a longer opportunity to file 
suit so that they have time to discover their injuries.259 As seen 
above, several of the deceased children were babies at the time of 
death. Had they lived to the age of three, four, or five, it is plausi­
ble that injuries not otherwise obvious would have presented them­
selves. The tolling provision, therefore, gives the child an 
opportunity to grow and develop, while also providing enough time 
so that the child may speak on her own behalf and possibly testify 
at a trial.260 
Some courts have given the rationale that death removes a mi­
nor's disability and, thus, there is no reason for the parents to have 
the opportunity to invoke the tolling provision.261 Yet, upon the 
death of a child, the challenges that a child would face bringing a 
suit under the age of legal majority still exist. Arguably the chal­
lenge for a plaintiff bringing suit on behalf of a deceased child is 
tougher because when a child dies, the best evidence of malpractice 
dies too. There is no one with visible injuries to take the stand and 
testify on his own behalf, nor is there an opportunity to see the 
entirety of the harm develop. Arguably, the same problem exists 
with a deceased adult. However, with an adult there is a presump­
tion that she would have the cognitive ability to tell her family of 
the harm she suffered; this is not so with a young child. If parents 
are forced to rely on administrator statutes and file suit within two 
years of the death, the lack of their best evidence-the child­
means the investigation must begin soon after the funeral. 
Defendants argue that while this may be a harsh result for 
plaintiff parents, it benefits the medical community and "serve[s] to 
provide some relief to physicians" by "effectively limit[ing] the un­
certainty regarding potential claims to a much shorter period. "262 
258. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428, 430 (N.M. 1985) (Sosa, J., 
dissenting). 
259. Id. (citing Slade v. Slade, 468 P.2d 627 (N.M. 1970». 
260. See id. 
261. See Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that 
"[the child's] death removed his legal age disability"), superseded by statute, IND. CODE 
ANN. § 34-23·2·1 (2008), as recognized in Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind. 
2006). 
262. Greene, supra note 237, at 4. 
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Fairness to defendants, fresh evidence, and avoiding stale claims are 
important concerns. However, when applied to parents of the de­
ceased children, this rationale is inconsistent with the very statutes 
at issue. Living children injured by medical negligence can wait un­
til they are nine years old in Massachusetts,263 ten in Michigan,264 
fourteen in Texas,265 eighteen in Indiana,266 and twenty in Penn­
sylvania to file a claim.267 If the evidence is still fresh for a living 
child after eighteen years, how can it be said that the evidence is 
stale for a deceased child? 
In each of these scenarios, whether the child be living or de­
ceased, after many years it is possible that the evidence and avail­
ability of witnesses will cease to be completely accurate, fresh, or 
otherwise useful. However, if the opportunity is available for a liv­
ing minor, it should also be available to those bringing a suit on 
behalf of a deceased minor. 
3. Statutes of Repose Slowly Disappear 
From Massachusetts to Texas, legislatures and courts have be­
gun to abolish absolute limitations on malpractice actions.268 Ini­
tially enacted to limit the number of medical malpractice claims 
that could be brought, statutes of repose are beginning to be re­
pealed and struck down as unconstitutional.269 On grounds of due 
process and equal protection, "minors filing medical wrongful death 
claims are the only class of plaintiffs whose rights are prematurely 
termina ted. "270 
Recently, the Massachusetts legislature has proposed amend­
ing its statute to eliminate the entirety of the minority provision and 
the statute of repose caveat, and replacing the section with the 
words "is discovered."271 The proposed amendment recognizes 
that an absolute bar on recovery may be unconstitutional and is 
263. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006). 
264. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7) (West 2000). 
265. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.251 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008), 
invalidated by Adams v. Gottwald, 179 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. App. 2005). 
266. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-7-1(b) (2008). 
267. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.513 (West Supp. 2008). 
268. See H.R. 1341, 185th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007); Hamrick, supra 
note 31, at 127-28; see also Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995); Sax v. Vot­
teler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983). 
269. Mantell, supra note 44, at 104-05; see also Strahler v. St. Luke's Hasp., 706 
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986); Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hasp., 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 
1983); Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 66l. 
270. Hamrick, supra note 31, at 128. 
271. Mass. H.R. 1341. 
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certainly contrary to public policy. The discovery rule provides a 
fairer time period in which the plaintiff can file suit, and promotes 
honesty within the doctor-patient relationship.272 Whereas previ­
ously claims that were over seven-years-old were ultimately dis­
missed as untimely in Massachusetts,273 this proposal allows parents 
to discover the injury and or malpractice and file suit accordingly. 
The rule as it stands today encourages deceit by the physician who, 
because of a medical error, believes a suit may be filed against him. 
If the physician can deceive the patient and escape being sued im­
mediately, he is effectively off-the-hook after seven years have 
passed. 
Though statutes of repose do not directly address the problem 
that a parent faces when attempting to invoke a minority tolling 
provision in a wrongful death suit, it is a helpful analogy. Legisla­
tures and courts are moving toward a more liberal approach to 
medical malpractice statutes by removing absolute bars on recov­
ery. If it is unconstitutional and unfair to bar a minor's recovery 
after seven years it can be analogized that barring a parent's claim 
on behalf of his child is also inequitable. 
C. The Appropriate Interpretation of the Statutes 
Parents who lose a child as a result of medical malpractice 
should be able to file a wrongful death action and invoke their de­
ceased child's right to toll the statute of limitation until the age of 
majority. If the plain-language interpretation supporting this posi­
tion274 is not convincing on its own, public policy, rules of civil pro­
cedure, and the status of the current medical malpractice cnSlS 
provide ample support for adopting this interpretation. 
272. The Connecticut case of Altieri v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. provides a good ex­
ample. See Altieri v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. X06CV020171626S, 2002 WL 31898323 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2002). Donna Marie Altieri was given a fatal dose of her prescription 
due to an error by a CVS pharmacist. Id. at *1. The Altieri family was told that she 
died of a heart attack and only after asking for an autopsy did they find her death to be 
the result of a morphine overdose. The Altieris became aware of the pharmacist's error 
after hiring a lawyer to investigate a potential malpractice lawsuit. If the family had 
delayed hiring an attorney and a statute of repose had been in effect, the pharmacy 
would have escaped liability. See BAKER, supra note 10, at 102-03. 
273. See, e.g., Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 2005). 
274. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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1. 	 Public Policy and Rules of Civil Procedure Are 

Furthered by a More Liberal Interpretation 

Allowing parents to invoke minority tolling provisions rights 
furthers the two goals of the tort system: compensation and deter­
rence.275 The rules of the tort system deter negligent behavior by 
imposing the costs of the injuries on the person who could have 
avoided the accident or injury.276 Furthermore, the tort system pro­
vides victims of negligent behavior compensation for their inju­
ries.277 By allowing a victim's parents to invoke minority tolling 
provision rights, the negligent behavior of doctors will be deterred 
and the victim's family will be compensated for the loss. On the 
other hand, preventing parents from using the minority tolling pro­
visions not only suppresses the goals of the tort system, but also 
compromises the rules of civil procedure and the very reasons why 
our country developed statutes of limitation. 
The federal rules of civil procedure were developed to resolve 
disputes through adjudication.278 Successful adjudication includes a 
determination of the appropriate legal standard, the facts of the dis~ 
pute, and the proper application of the law to the facts to determine 
the remedy.279 With these goals in mind, state and federal govern­
ments drafted rules of civil procedure. The principal goal of civil 
procedure is that "cases should not turn on procedural technicali­
ties, but instead should be decided with an emphasis on 
accuracy."280 
Applying these principles, the legal standard that society seeks 
to enforce through medical malpractice statutes is the deterrence of 
negligent medical care. Therefore, a doctor who negligently punc­
tured a child's heart during surgery and caused the death of that 
child has violated the legal standard.281 Consequently, compensa­
tory damages should be awarded to the victims of the negligence. 
However, in the case of parents filing wrongful death malpractice 
suits, such compensation has been denied due to a technicality-the 
parents' belief that their claim was timely under the minority tolling 
275. ROBERT E. LITAN & CLIFFORD WINSTON, LIABILITY: PERSPEcrIVES AND 
POLICY 3 (1988). 
276. Jd. 
277. Jd. 
278. See SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, ESSENTIALS: CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 
(2007). 
279. Jd. at 11-12. 
280. Jd. at 3l. 
281. See Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 2005). 
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provision. Even if courts are unpersuaded that the plain language 
refers to both living and deceased minors' rights to bring suit, the 
fact that an otherwise valid claim is dismissed summarily is against 
public policy and the goals of the civil procedure system. These 
claims should be allowed to proceed on their merits, therefore 
reaching the accuracy of the cases. The legislatures have been 
clear. They intended to enact statutes that allow children who have 
been victims of medical malpractice to bring valid claims against 
their tortfeasors. The purpose of the statutes is to allow a child 
without the faculties or knowledge to have an extended time period 
in order to develop skills to articulate his injury. To deny parents 
who have lost a child the same rights that their child would have 
had, is particularly unjust-especially because the parents have the 
difficult task of deciphering the harm their child suffered without 
the help of that child. 
2. 	 Medical Malpractice Statutes Are Not Compromised by 
This Interpretation 
Allowing parents of deceased children additional time to bring 
suit is not inconsistent with the goal of reducing frivolous law­
suits.282 The limitations were created in response to a medical mal­
practice crisis to limit the number of suits that could be brought and 
thereby reduce the cost of physician malpractice insurance premi­
ums.283 Dismissing claims brought by parents who have relied on 
the minority tolling provision does not have the effect of reducing 
frivolous lawsuits. It reduces neither insurance premiums nor the 
cost of health care because the cases are dismissed before any frivo­
lousness could have been known. The claims are never determined 
to be frivolous because they are never judged on their merits. 
These claims have been summarily dismissed, solely because 
parents relied on their child's right to toll the statute of limitations. 
The plaintiffs in these lawsuits could have had excellent evidence 
that the standard of care was breached, expert witnesses to testify 
as to the causation, and an otherwise "home run" case. In tort par­
lance, but for the technicality of the tolling provision, they could 
have proceeded. Even if these claims were allowed to proceed on 
their facts, there is no conclusive evidence that medical malpractice 
premiums would skyrocket as a result. The meritorious claims 
282. See generally LITAN & WINSTON, supra note 275, at 101-27. 
283. See Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003). 
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would proceed to settlement or a jury trial-as it should-and the 
frivolous claims, or claims where there was no proof of causation, 
would be weeded out through the discovery process. Because the 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and in most cases it has been 
several years since the alleged malpractice, there is a great 
probability that few of the parents invoking the minority tolling 
provision would have successful cases. Thus, the population of 
plaintiffs having any effect on the insurance industry would be min­
iscule and the malpractice statutes would still retain their teeth. 
3. 	 Changing Perceptions: Are Physicians and Insurance 
Companies Really the Ones to Blame? 
The medical malpractice "crisis" to which so many state legisla­
tures responded may have ties to causes other than "frivolous litiga­
tion and runaway juries."284 "[A]s many as 98,000 people die each 
year in American hospitals due to medical errors, more than auto 
accidents, breast cancer, and HIV/AIDS combined."285 Perhaps 
the litigation is in response to the sub-par level of care being admin­
istered. Additionally, opponents of those who would call the medi­
cal insurance premium hike a "crisis" counter this proposition by 
saying that it is "an insurance crisis, not a tort crisis."286 Donald 
Zuk, chief executive of SCPIE Holdings, a medical malpractice in­
surer, was quoted as stating, "I don't like to hear insurance-com­
pany executives say it's the tort system-it'S self inflicted."287 The 
problem is this: 
Liability insurance goes through a boom-and-bust cycle .... To­
ward the end of the cycle, they take an increasingly optimistic 
view of future losses and do not set aside enough reserves. As a 
result, they begin charging prices that are too low in relation to 
the risk. Because medical malpractice claims take so long to re­
solve ... the shortfalls in the reserves to pay medical malpractice 
claims accumulate over a number of years. When the insurance 
climate shifts back to a pessimistic view of future losses, insur­
ance companies need to increase their reserves, sometimes quite 
dramatically ... and prices rise accordingly.288 
284. BAKER, supra note 10, at 2. 
285. Remaking American Medicine, Episode #1: The Silent Killer, http://www. 
remakingamericanmedicine.orglepisodel.htmi (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
286. BAKER, supra note 10, at 45. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. at 66. 
533 2009] BETTER OFF DEAD? 
If the problem of unaffordable medical malpractice insurance 
has forced doctors to leave the profession, perhaps they have only 
themselves and their insurers to blame. Regardless of the reasons 
for the increased rates, plaintiffs who bring valid claims to court 
deserve to have their cases litigated. They should not be summarily 
turned away on a technicality designed to protect the insurance 
companies and negligent medical staff. 
CONCLUSION 
Minority tolling provisions enable minors to realize the full 
scope of the harm inflicted on them before filing suit. When a child 
dies, this harm is even more difficult to articulate because the best 
evidence of what the harm was that led to the death has also died. 
Allowing a parent to have the same amount of time that the child 
himself would have had to file suit allows for the parent to fully 
understand and investigate the potential medical malpractice claim 
and avoids the quick-fire filing of a frivolous claim. Allowing reli­
ance by the parent, or administrator, only provides the benefit that 
the child would have had and no more. The argument that this ad­
ditional time allows for the spoliation of evidence or causes unavail­
ability of witnesses falls short because it is the same time period 
allowed by statute for a minor. This is especially true in states 
where the statute is tolled for up to eighteen years.289 
Furthermore, allowing reliance on the minority tolling provi­
sion after the child has died is consistent with both the legislative 
intent and the plain language of these statutes. This interpretation 
promotes compensation and deterrence, the goals of the tort sys­
tem, as well as resolving disputes on the merits of each case, the 
goal of civil procedure. Additionally, public policy is furthered by a 
liberal interpretation and application of the minority tolling provi­
sions. Plaintiffs have an opportunity to be heard and can be com­
pensated for their losses while physicians are deterred from 
wrongdoing. Most importantly, a child's death due to an adult's 
negligence does not go unpunished or overlooked. 
Gretchen R. Fuhr 
289. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (West 2004) (statute is 
tolled until minor reaches eighteen years of age). 
